



# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 13

BETHANY  
COLLEGE  
LIBRARY

## New Factors in Disarmament

by William R. Frye

With the departure of Harold E. Stassen to the Pennsylvania political wars on February 15, the problem of disarmament has shifted back to John Foster Dulles' State Department, whence it came in 1955. It is now, in effect, simply another complicated aspect of United States foreign policy. The cynic might say that the chances of a disarmament agreement have improved, if only because Mr. Stassen's opponents in Washington, who never would have wanted him to receive credit for an agreement, would now be perfectly willing to see Mr. Dulles succeed.

But this element, while possibly a factor, is obviously not a major concern. The core of the matter is that, henceforth, there will no longer be any question of negotiating a "first-step" disarmament agreement independently of a political settlement in Europe. In the language of diplomacy the bargaining currency which the West has saved up to purchase a European security arrangement will not be spent to buy a limited arms-control treaty. Whether or not such a limited purchase would have been wise and in the interest of the United States was, undoubtedly, the real issue between Stassen and Dulles.

This is not to say that East-West negotiations in 1958—and there obviously will be such negotiations—need necessarily revolve around a mammoth, all-out effort to settle the cold war. On the contrary the focus unquestionably will be on much more limited issues—perhaps, despite repeated official disclaimers, some variant of the so-called Rapacki plan for Central Europe (which in fact was first offered by Andrei A. Gromyko in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee in 1956).

It is logical that the terms of reference of arms negotiations should be changing, because the subject matter to be negotiated is undergoing fundamental change. The whole open-skies idea, for example, will soon be outdated. It will not be necessary to photograph the Soviet Union from the air by plane when a reconnaissance satellite is transmitting almost constant TV-type images of the earth's surface. Thus within roughly a year's time, it no longer will be relevant to negotiate about the exchange of aerial photography rights in limited areas of Europe and the Arctic Circle. Soviet willingness to agree to such photography was one of Moscow's principal elements of bargaining strength, so to that extent, at

MARCH 15, 1958

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED  
345 EAST 46TH STREET • NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG  
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least, the West stands to gain from technological progress.

Outer space, however, will be the focus of arms talks of the future. What the United States and its allies have gained in the area of open skies, they have more than lost in this field. It is not wholly true that the West wants to prohibit what it hasn't got (as Communist party Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev has charged); but from the point of view of the bargaining process there is an uncomfortable element of truth in this. Intercontinental weapons are of greater strategic importance to the U.S.S.R. than they are, or will be, to the United States for the simple reason that the United States does not need them—and so long as its alliances remain intact, will not need them—to bomb the U.S.S.R. Moscow does need them, however, to reach the United States. Thus their abolition would be immensely to the advantage of the free world.

A manned space-satellite could be equipped with instrumentation to guide an intercontinental missile to its target. Missiles could even be launched from such a satellite, although the technical problems involved would be vastly more difficult. Every indication available to the general public suggests that the Soviet Union is nearer a manned space-satellite than the United States is—perhaps years nearer. If this is indeed the case, Moscow has another element of bargaining strength of very considerable significance.

Where, then, can we of the West look for compensating bargaining

power? We clearly cannot pay the price the Russians are asking for a space pact: abandonment of NATO and abolition of nuclear weapons. This demand is merely a Soviet device to avoid negotiation on space problems without taking the onus for so doing.

### Fear of Germany

The only visible element of Western bargaining power in any way comparable to that of the U.S.S.R. is Soviet fear of Germany—especially, of a nuclear-armed Germany. This nightmare seems to have haunted the Kremlin ever since the West first announced it would give the Germans weapons. Anguished protests have been voiced by Soviet diplomats from that day to this, in public and in private; and few doubt that this fear of an historic enemy is genuine. The latest suggestion—that missile-launching platforms be installed on German soil—seems to have made a particular impression on Moscow.

The West's original purpose of bringing West Germany into NATO, of course, was to gain bargaining power with which to purchase the unification of Germany in freedom. What Washington now envisages is that the West try to purchase not only the unification of Germany but also control of outer space and freedom for the Soviet satellite empire. It is a tall order.

The real meaning of the Rapacki plan is that the Soviet Union is trying to obtain release from its fear of West Germany at a bargain price. The price the Soviets are offering is,

first, a pledge not to give Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany nuclear weapons—weapons which might, in any event, be used against the U.S.S.R. in a crisis; and, second, a veiled hint that Soviet armed forces might be withdrawn from, or thinned out in, these three satellites. Only in the latter respect is the proposal of the slightest interest. A Soviet troop withdrawal could mean the loss of Soviet political control in the area. If this is to be an experiment in the gradual release of three Soviet satellites, it is at least worth talking about. The unification of Germany would have to be included, but this might be an inevitable result of the withdrawal of Soviet political and military power from East Germany. At any rate, the larger settlement dreamed of in the West does not seem attainable. It may be that nothing short of another Hungary-type uprising could restore the bargaining power of the West sufficiently to make satisfactory over-all agreement feasible.

Mr. Stassen, of course, must have been disappointed to lose his White House job. But it was a frustrating job, with little apparent future. Perhaps he will be a happier man fighting for a political comeback in Pennsylvania. At least he is free to speak his mind more frankly—for example, on the subject of a nuclear weapons test ban.

Mr. Frye, a member of the staff of *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1941, has been its United Nations correspondent for eight years, writing frequently on disarmament problems.

Published twice a month by the FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INC., 345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y., U.S.A. EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: JOHN S. BADEAU • BENJAMIN J. BUTTENWIESER • HENRY STEELE COMMAGER • BROOKS EMENY • AUGUST HECKSHER • MRS. W. HOUSTON KENYON, JR. • MARGARET PARTON • STEPHEN H. STACKPOLE • ANNA LORD STRAUSS. JOHN W. NASON, *President*; VERA MICHELES DEAN, *Editor*; NEAL STANFORD, *Washington Contributor*; GWEN CROWE, *Assistant Editor*. • *The Foreign Policy Association contributes to the public understanding by presenting a cross-section of views on world affairs. The Association as an organization takes no position on international issues. Any opinions expressed in its publications are those of the authors.* • Subscription Rates: \$4.00 a year; single copies 20 cents. RE-ENTERED AS SECOND-CLASS MATTER SEPTEMBER 26, 1951 AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N.Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. Please allow one month for change of address. Contents of this BULLETIN may be reproduced with credit to the Foreign Policy Association.

347

*Produced under union conditions and composed, printed and bound by union labor.*





## Summit Talks: Unnecessary, but Inevitable

A summit meeting with the Russians is inevitable, not because it is necessary, but because the Russians insist on it.

If the Russians are determined not to talk seriously on vital issues except at the summit, then the West has no choice but to go to the summit if these things are to be discussed.

In any case there are four points which must be settled before there can be a summit meeting: how it is to be set up; where it is to be held; who is to attend; and what is to be discussed. There seems to be no problem about the place. The 1955 summit meeting was held at Geneva, and it is generally accepted that the next one will also be held there.

There has been progress on procedure. Moscow has come round to the American position that there must be some kind of preparation for summit talks; and Washington has come round to Russia's view that a presummit foreign ministers' meeting is not essential. So preparations, presumably, will be made through normal diplomatic channels—through ambassadors and foreign offices. Moscow is no longer insisting there be no presummit exploration of the many issues to be discussed; the United States is no longer insisting that Messrs. Dulles and Gromyko must reach at least broad agreements on substantive matters prior to a heads-of-government conference.

But there are still plenty of obstacles, and serious ones, to a summit meeting. There is disagreement on an agenda. And there is going to be serious disagreement on who attends.

First, however, about the agenda. Moscow and Washington have (through letters exchanged between

President Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin) listed the things each wants to talk about. Actually each has submitted a couple of lists. One subject Moscow first suggested has already been settled. This is the cultural exchange agreement signed on January 27 by Soviet Ambassador Georgi N. Zaroubin and United States Ambassador William S. B. Lacy.

### What Is to Be on Agenda?

The United States has said that the subject of German reunification should be raised. It was raised, and thought to have been settled at the last summit meeting in Geneva. But now Moscow takes the position that German reunification is not a proper subject for summit talks. The two Germanys, say the Russians, are the only ones who have the right to talk about their future. Then there is the question of Eastern Europe. President Eisenhower has said that free and democratic elections, promised by Stalin at Yalta, should be discussed, for it is obvious that Eastern Europe's regimes do not reflect the will of the people. To this Moscow replies there is nothing doing. This is one subject that is positively prohibited by the U.S.S.R.

President Eisenhower has asked that outer-space control be discussed. Moscow is not unwilling, but it does not want to talk just about outer-space control. It has made two qualifications for outer-space talks, one of which is self-defeating and the other, preposterous. Moscow has said that outer-space control must be tied into a disarmament package—the same package on which East and West talks have stalled for a year or more.

Under this plan the West was to stop nuclear tests and nuclear weapons production, but with no inspection arrangements to make sure Russia as well as the United States observes the agreement.

Bulganin's letter of February 2 also demanded that all foreign bases be eliminated and that United States forces leave the European continent. This means the dissolution of NATO, and Moscow knows Washington has no more intention of destroying this alliance than of stopping nuclear tests and weapons production just on Moscow's say-so that it will do likewise. But there is more to come. The Kremlin actually has not offered a *quid pro quo*; it has offered a "possible" *quid* for a "certain" *quo*. It will "consider" outer-space control if the United States will "promise" to stop tests and nuclear weapons production.

Disagreement over who is to participate in summit talks is only beginning to emerge. Moscow would like this to be a twosome—just the United States and the U.S.S.R. settling all world issues. But the United States is not going to, in fact cannot, talk for its allies, so Moscow will have to accept more participants. The result is the Kremlin now wants to take in all the NATO powers and all the Warsaw pact nations, with India, Afghanistan, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Austria thrown in—and of course Red China, which, Moscow says, "goes without saying." So there may be a real debate, not only over agenda, but also over what nations are to take part. A summit meeting seems inevitable, but it is not immediate.

NEAL STANFORD



## Is Disengagement in Europe Feasible?

by James P. Warburg

Mr. Warburg, who has served the government in various capacities, is the author of many books, pamphlets and articles on problems of American foreign policy. A specific plan for a German settlement was suggested by the author in *Germany—Key to Peace* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953).

**O**UR PROBLEM is not how to win the arms race, but how to end it.

But before there can be any real progress toward disarmament, there must be at least some disengagement, some unlocking of horns and, above all, a mutual recognition that neither side can hope to get more of what it wants than is obtainable through fair compromise.

The fatal pattern of the cold war, in which each side has stubbornly sought to obtain the unconditional surrender of the other instead of a fair compromise, was first set in Germany.

As long ago as 1949, I vainly endeavored to point out the fallacy of the European policy upon which the Truman administration was then embarking. In testifying before the State Department Policy Planning Staff as well as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I warned that rearming West Germany would not, as Secretary of State Dean Acheson contended, create a "position of strength" from which we should then be able to negotiate an all-German settlement permitting a reunited Germany to become a partner in the NATO alliance; but that, on the contrary, the rearming of West Germany would create additional tensions, freeze Germany's partition and block the road to a European peace settlement.

### Neutralization the Alternative

The alternative recommended was to recognize that neither we nor the Russians could reasonably hope to wrest control of a united Germany from the other; that a divided Ger-

many would mean a divided and explosive Europe; and that the only way to reunite Germany would be to neutralize it.

In those days anyone who suggested the neutralization of Germany occupied a rather lonely position. However, although I did not know it at the time, there was one man in the State Department who shared my views and supported them within the inner councils of the Truman administration. That man was George F. Kennan, then chief of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, who has recently performed a great public service in reviving and bringing about a world-wide discussion of the long-dormant issue.

Whatever their ultimate motives, the Russians have, over the years, put

forward repeated proposals for negotiation from which it is not too difficult to deduce, at least in part, what they would or would not be willing to do.

We know, for example, that the Russians will never agree to German reunification on terms permitting all of Germany to become a partner in the anti-Communist NATO alliance. Indeed, why should they? Yet this is precisely what we have been demanding at conference after conference for the past eight years.

We know that the Russians would like to get American forces out of Europe and that, for even a partial withdrawal, they would apparently pay a considerable price in the partial liberation of their satellites.

(Continued on page 102)

*Excerpts from "The Problem of Eastern and Central Europe," the third of six Reith lectures given by George F. Kennan on the BBC and published in The Listener, (London), November 28, 1957.*

Today, our calculations with regard to Moscow's reaction to proposals for a mutual withdrawal of forces rest exclusively on speculation; for Moscow has been given no reason to suppose that Western forces would under any circumstances be withdrawn from the major portion of Germany. . . .

It is, of course, impossible to discuss this question in specific terms unless one knows just what sort of withdrawal is envisaged—from where and to where, and by whom and when. Here, as is frequently forgotten, there are many possible combinations; and I am not at all sure

that all of these have really been seriously explored by our military planners.

But, beyond this, I have the impression that our calculations in this respect continue to rest on certain questionable assumptions and habits of thought: on an overrating of the likelihood of a Soviet effort to invade Western Europe, on an exaggeration of the value of the satellite armies as possible instruments of a Soviet offensive policy, on a failure to take into account the implications of the ballistic missile, and on a serious underestimation of the advantages to Western security to be derived from a Soviet military withdrawal from Central and Eastern Europe. I wonder how the military implications of a general withdrawal would appear if these distortions were removed. . . .

by **George N. Shuster**

Dr. Shuster, president of Hunter College, New York City, is the author of several books on Germany and was deputy in Bavaria to High Commissioner John J. McCloy in 1950-51.

**I**F HYDROGEN bombs in sufficient number to destroy all life on the globe are stored in the arsenals of the United States, it must be assumed that the Russians have, or soon will have, an equally ominous supply. The only way to forestall the suicide of the human race is to disarm. This means securing the adoption of three measures: multilateral supervision and control of all military installations; the formation of a neutral United Nations force to put the supervision and control into effect; and the systematic destruction, step by step, of all nuclear weapons other than the purely tactical ones. In my judgment it must be the primary concern of our foreign policy to bring about disarmament thus understood.

But what can possibly be gained at this juncture by weakening our military strength without obtaining a compensatory sacrifice of power from Moscow? Yet this is clearly what would happen were we to endorse George F. Kennan's proposal to bring about "disengagement in Europe" by assenting first of all to the neutralization of Germany. Note that Mr. Kennan's Reith lectures suggested this most tentatively and attached strings to the proposed bargain which may not have been taken into sufficient account in subsequent comment. Professor Hans Morgenthau of Chicago University and I twice discussed and publicly advocated a similar proposal during the years immediately following the war. Then Russian agreement to a neutral Europe might well have nipped the armament race in the bud and assured the freedom of Poland, Hun-

gary and other countries. Unfortunately, there was never the slightest indication that such an agreement could be reached.

### **Russia Wants Vacuum**

To what would Moscow be likely to assent today? Obviously it would

*From former Secretary of State Dean Acheson's statement as reported in The New York Times of January 12.*

I am told that the impression exists in Europe that the views expressed by Mr. George Kennan in his Reith lectures, particularly that a proposal should be made for the withdrawal of American, British and Russian troops from Europe, represent the views of the Democratic party in the United States. Most categorically they do not, as Mr. Kennan would, I am sure, agree.

The opinions stated in the Reith lectures are not now made by Mr. Kennan for the first time. They were expounded by him within the Democratic Administration early in 1949, and rejected. They are, today, contrary to the expressed opinion of Democratic leaders in the Congress and outside of it. . . .

like to create a military vacuum in Central Europe, thus gaining advantages of immeasurable importance. But under such conditions the United States would have deprived itself, in the event of conflict, of a potentially very useful ally, Germany. The Russians would have secured such

superiority of terrain for the use of tactical weapons that the only way of redressing the balance would be "massive retaliation" on our part—in other words, recourse to suicide. There is no discernible shred of evidence that, having obtained such a sacrifice from the West, the Kremlin would suddenly be eager to proceed with the only kind of disarmament that really counts. On this point the argument of Mr. Acheson seems to me wholly incontrovertible.

Consider, as a case in point, the Austrian peace treaty. Whatever may have induced the Russians, at long last, to sign this agreement, it was certainly not a loss of military advantage. By adding a long strip of neutral Austrian territory to an already neutral Switzerland, the Russians effectively prevented any accession of strength from Italy or the Mediterranean area to Western forces stationed in the north of Europe. If this was not a brilliant strategic move, it is difficult to conceive of one.

Returning to West Germany, it seems evident that a peace treaty which would involve the removal of American troops from Western Europe or, at the very least, place these troops at the gravest disadvantage by depriving them of tactical atomic weapons would be disastrous unless the political future of the whole of Germany had been democratically determined in advance. This the Russians have persistently vetoed. We have only to assume with virtual certainty that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the German Democratic Republic would be followed by an uprising to overthrow the government of Herr Walter Ulbricht in order to raise the fateful question, What would we do if the Russians then intervened with parachute troops and overran the "island" of Berlin? No doubt, nothing, save to welcome another group of refugees to Camp Kilmer.

A still more ominous consequence of "disengagement" as so far proposed would be a crushing blow to the forces which have been working hard for a united Europe. This is the only constructive idea which has grown out of the war. How can it be fostered if Germany is excluded from the NATO alliance, which is not only military but also economic and political in character? To consider the Rapacki "plan" from this point of view is to expose it as a device for weakening the West. It would compel recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state and would at the same time, to all intents and purposes, disarm Western forces stationed in Germany.

To be sure, there are realistic ways of bringing about "European disengagement." These ways were spelled out in words of one syllable at the Berlin and Geneva conferences. If anyone can discern in the record any trace of Russian readiness to be realistic, well and good. But until then, daydreaming is merely a pastime.

## Warburg

(Continued from page 100)

On November 17, 1956, the Soviet government proposed a withdrawal of all Western and Soviet forces from the European continent west of the Soviet frontier. The Arden House disarmament conference of December, 1956 urged President Eisenhower to reply to the Soviet note with a counterproposal, suggesting, as the first step in a carefully phased mutual withdrawal, the retirement of Western forces behind the Rhine in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal behind the Oder and Neisse rivers. Two Senators, one a Republican and the other a Democrat, took this proposal to the President. It was rejected, chiefly on the ground that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, then about to run for

re-election, would not approve of it.

During the disarmament talks at London early in 1957 Harold E. Stassen apparently attempted to revive the idea of a "thinned-out zone" in Central Europe. These efforts were brought to a halt when, after Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Washington, Mr. Dulles flew to London in order to set Mr. Stassen upon what he conceived to be the right track.

On December 10, 1957, just before the NATO conference in Paris, Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin wrote to Chancellor Adenauer, repeating the earlier Russian proposal and suggesting in addition the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons to include not only East and West Germany, but Poland and Czechoslovakia as well. The latter idea had been originated by Poland's Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki.

## Germany and Russia

Between his re-election in September 1957 and the NATO conference in December, Chancellor Adenauer found himself forced to make some concession to the prevailing current of German opinion, which flowed strongly toward the belief that, far from standing in the way of German reunification, a phased withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces from Germany might well create the only conditions in which reunification could take place. It was significant that, at the December 1957 NATO conference, it was he who led the revolt against the expressed American intention to ignore the Bulganin overtures.

At this NATO conference last December an extraordinary thing happened. The final communiqué, of which Mr. Dulles was reported to be the chief author, contained the following paragraph:

"At the Geneva conference of heads of government in July, 1955 the Soviet leaders took a solemn com-

mitment that 'the unification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.' We call upon the Soviet government to honor this pledge."

President Eisenhower's NATO speech contained the same statement as to the alleged Soviet commitment, followed by this sentence: "Unhappily, that promise has been repudiated at the cost of the international confidence which the Soviet rulers profess to desire."

Now, according to responsible reporters present at the Geneva meeting in 1955, all that actually happened there with respect to Germany was that the chiefs of state issued a directive to the foreign ministers "to continue consideration" of the German question, stating their agreement that the matter of reunification by free elections should be settled "in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security." The chiefs of state were unable to agree as to which of these two interests came first. Chalmers Roberts of the *Washington Post and Times Herald* recently commented in *The Reporter*: "Every newsman who was at Geneva, this writer included, knows that to be a fact. And so does Mr. Dulles."

Yet, the assertion that the Russians agreed at Geneva to unify Germany through free elections and later repudiated their solemn agreement was made by Mr. Dulles in a press conference, then in a speech at Chicago, and still later in an interview in London over the British Broadcasting Corporation just prior to the NATO conference. Finally, it found its way into the President's speech and, amazingly enough, into the NATO communiqué. It is now the foundation of our government's case against taking up the Bulganin proposals.



*Excerpts from memorandum of February 17, 1958 by Adam Rapacki, Polish Foreign Minister, delivered to the United States ambassador in Warsaw, as published in The New York Times, February 18. This memorandum elaborates the proposal for a denuclearized zone in Central Europe presented by Mr. Rapacki to the United Nations General Assembly on October 2, 1957 and known as the Rapacki plan.*

I. The proposed zone should include the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic

public and the German Federal Republic. In this territory nuclear weapons would neither be manufactured nor stockpiled, the equipment and installations designed for their servicing would not be located there, the use of nuclear weapons against the territory of this zone would be prohibited.

II. . . . 3. The powers which have at their disposal nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to use these weapons against the territory of the zone or against any targets situated in this zone.

Thus, the powers would undertake

the obligation to respect the status of the zone as an area in which there should be no nuclear weapons and against which nuclear weapons should not be used. . . .

III. 1. . . . The states concerned would undertake to create a system of broad and effective control in the area of the proposed zone and submit themselves to its functioning.

This system could comprise ground as well as aerial control. Adequate control posts, with rights and possibilities of action which would ensure the effectiveness of inspection, could also be established. . . .

#### FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



## Whose UN Is It?

The February 8 bombing by the French air force of the Tunisian village Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef on the Algerian border dramatically pinpointed the strengths and weaknesses of the United Nations.

The first reaction of Tunisia's moderate, pro-Western president, Habib Bourguiba, was to appeal to the UN Security Council. Subsequently the president announced that he had ordered Ambassador Mongi Slim, his ambassador to Washington and the UN, to enlarge Tunisia's complaint into a demand for Security Council investigation of the rebellion against France in Algeria. If this were done, the thing France had most bitterly opposed would occur: internationalization of the issue of the nearly four-year war in Algeria, which is described as "an integral part" of metropolitan France and, therefore, according to the French, solely a domestic matter.

To avert this eventuality France accepted the good offices of the United States and Britain in its dispute with Tunisia. The Western nations thus hoped to avoid the pitfalls of a

public debate in the UN which, in their opinion, would only serve the propaganda purposes of the U.S.S.R. and of the Arab states friendly to Algeria.

This incident reveals three major problems faced by the UN.

### No Supergovernment

First, it is just as true today as it was when the UN was founded at San Francisco in 1945 that the world organization has no power of its own to intervene in controversies that may threaten the peace. It is not, as claimed by some of its critics, a supergovernment. Nor does it have at its command even a modest international security force contributed by member states, as provided for in the UN Charter.

Thus the UN must continue to depend on its member states for the authority to act in cases brought before it. When a recalcitrant member refuses to accept UN discussion, resolutions or action—as France has done on Algeria, the U.S.S.R. on Hungary, South Africa on *apartheid* and Southwest Africa—the UN can do

no more than focus world public opinion on the given issue. This situation has caused an American commentator, writing in a newspaper which has long opposed the UN, to call it "the tombstone on the East River."

But if a majority of the UN members do agree on a course of action, the world organization is in a position to take rapid and effective measures. This was demonstrated by the decision in 1956 to create the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which successfully patrols the once bloody Egyptian-Israeli border in Sinai. This small international force, recruited from ten nations outside the ranks of the great powers, is a portent of what the UN could do in policing trouble spots if its Charter's provisions for a collective security force were carried out.

### Cold War in UN

Second, the UN has been blocked again and again by the results of the cold war. Not only has the struggle between the West and the U.S.S.R. prevented fulfilment of the Charter's

military provisions, but discussion of every important issue in the Security Council and the General Assembly has become a vying for position between the great powers.

This transfer of the cold war to the UN forum has had two consequences. On the one hand, military alliances have been formed outside the UN, as is permitted under Article 51 of the Charter pending the creation of a UN collective security force: the Warsaw pact, NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad pact. On the other hand, the Western powers have tried to decide controversial issues ~~outside the UN by diplomatic negotiations~~, as permitted by Article 33 of the Charter, to prevent participation by the U.S.S.R. Moscow, for its part, has made full use of Council and Assembly debates to cast aspersions on the motives and actions of the Western powers.

Third, the smaller countries and, in the case of India, weak great nations have sought to achieve their own objectives by pooling their votes in blocs. The most important of these are the 29-nation Afro-Arab-Asian bloc and the 20-nation Latin American group which frequently votes as a bloc and has found itself in sympathy with the nations of Africa, Asia and the Middle East on economic problems.

The existence of these blocs has

troubled the Western powers, which fear that the less developed (and, they think, less responsible) nations, that now constitute a majority in the UN, may use their votes to defeat the West and thereby aid the U.S.S.R. To prevent this some Westerners have suggested the adoption of weighted voting—with the great powers assigned more votes than the small nations. There is no agreement, however, as to the basis for giving extra votes. Should it be done on the basis of population or resources or education or what? By some of these yardsticks—population and resources—our Western allies would fare ill as compared with Russia and Communist China (if the latter were admitted to the UN). Others—notably education—would precipitate a controversy which might outdo the ideological war in bitterness. Moreover, non-Western nations do not always act as a bloc—as witness Sudan's appeal to the UN against Egypt.

### UN: Public Servant

When we ask ourselves, then, "Whose UN is it?" it seems inconceivable that the world organization should become an instrument either of the great powers or of blocs of small nations. If the UN is to survive at all, it must be in a position to serve the interests of all its members, whether rich or poor, strong or

weak, irrespective of color, creed, and present condition of literacy, public health or economic development. Only thus can the UN function as a democratic community of nations rather than as a congeries of groups representing special interests. But the UN can perform this service only if its members show increasing willingness to place greater authority in the hands of the UN secretary-general, whose role is to act as public servant of the world community. This is the way in which Dag Hammarskjöld conceives his role; and his unanimous re-election on September 26, 1957 for another five-year term shows that the UN members accept his view.

Mr. Hammarskjöld has worked hard behind the scenes to ease tensions between nations and blocs of nations. If he is able to persist in this course, the UN may not achieve the rosiest dreams of its most ardent supporters, but neither will it become a tombstone for their dreams. What it can do is grow into a well-functioning institution, with the strengths, not merely the weaknesses, that institutions created by human beings can possess.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(This is the last of eight articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1958"—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

### In this issue:

New Factors in Disarmament—W. R. Frye.....	97
Summit Talks: Unnecessary, but Inevitable— N. Stanford.....	99
Is Disengagement in Europe Feasible?— J. P. Warburg.....	100
G. N. Shuster.....	101
Whose UN Is It?— V. M. Dean.....	103

### In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—  
Israel's First Decade,  
by Don Peretz

BETHANY COLLEGE LIBR.

BETHANY

W. VA.

LS-11